Policy makers typically approach human behavior from the perspective of the rational a g ent model, \Vhich relics on norn1ativc, a priori analyses. The nlodel assumes people make insightful, well-planned, highly controlled, and calculated decisions guided by considerations of personal utility. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in protCssional schools and has come to don1inate much of the for mulation and conduct of policy. An alternative vie\\', developed mostly through empirical behavioral re search, and the one V.'C \Vill articulate here, provides a substantially difierent perspective on individual behavior and its policy and regulatory implications.
According to the empirical perspective, behavior is the an1algam of perceptions, in1pulses, judgments, and decision processes that emerge from the impres sive machinery that people carry behind the eyes and benveen the ears. Actual human behavior, it is argued, is often unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A n1ore nuanced behavioral perspec tive, it is suggested, can yield deeper understanding and in1proved regulatory insight.
for a motivating example, consider the recent mortgage crisis in the United States. While the po tential causes are 1nyriad, a central proble1n \Vas that n1any borro\vers \Vere offered and took out loans that they did not understand and could not afford, \Vith di sastrous results for the borro\vers, financial firms, and the national economy. Borrov.'ers, like most people, arc not \veil described by the rational agent nlodel.
At the same ti1ne, \Ve argue, a behavioral perspective that fOcuses only on the individual is incomplete for policy purposes. In so1ne contexts, firms have strong incentives to exploit consu1ner biases and v.. ·ill shape their conduct in response not only to the behavior of consumers but also to the actions of regulators. Thus, policy also needs to take into account market contexts and the incentives and behaviors that they affOrd firms.
In •vhat fO!lov .. ·s, \\'e v.. rill outline some of the n1ain research underpinning the behavioral perspective pertinent to regulation. We v.. rill explore ho\v firms interact with consumers in different market contexts and \Vill propose a model tOr understanding this in teraction. We \viii then develop an analytic fran1ev.. rork fOr behaviorally infOrmed regulation and conclude \Vith examples of relevant policy applications.
Dn Behavior
In contrast v.. ·ith the classical theory, \Vhich is driven by rational agents v.. ·ho make well-infOrmed, carefully considered, and fully controlled choices, behavioral research has sho\vn that individuals depart from this decision-making model in important \\'ays. Among other things, the availability and dissemination of data do not always lead to effective con1n1unication and kno\vledgc; understanding and intention do not necessarily lead to the desired action; and purportedly inconsequential contextual nuances, \\'hether inten tional or not, can shape behavior and alter choices, often in \vays that people themselves agree din1in ish their \\'Cll-being in unintended \vays. Individuals often exhibit temporal biases and mistOrecast their O\Vn behavior. By way of illustration, \Ve \viii highlight ho\v context, decisional conflict, mental accounting, knowledge and attention constraints, and institutions, shape individual decisions and behavior.
Context
Human behavior turns out to be hea\'ily context de pendent, a function of both the person and the situa tion. ()ne of the nlajor lessons of modern psychologi cal research is the in1pressi\'e po\ver that the situation exerts, along \\'ith a persistent tendency to underes timate that po\vcr relative to the presumed influence of intention, education, or personality traits. In his no\v-classic obedience studies, fOr exa1nple, Milgra1n ( 197 4) sho\\·ed ho\v decidedly mild situational pressures sufficed to generate persistent \Villingncss, against their O\\'n \vishes, on the part of individuals to administer \vhat they believed to be grave levels of electric shock to innocent subjects. Along si1nilar lines, Darley and Batson (1973) recruited scn1inary students to deliver a practice sermon on the parable of the Good Samaritan. While half the seminarians were told they had plenty of time, others \Vere led to believe they \Vere running late. On their \vay to give the talk, all participants passed an ostensibly injured man slumped in a door\vay groaning. Whereas the majority of those with time to spare stopped to help, a mere 10% of those \Vho \Vere running late stopped, while the remaining 90% stepped over the victim and This imbalance can generate systematically misguided plans among consun1ers, \vho, reassured by their good intentions, proceed to put themselves in ill-conceived situations that are pov.'crfu l enough to 1nake them act and choose other\vise.
Decisional Conflict
Three decades of behavioral research have led to the notion that people's preferences arc typically con structed, not merely revealed, during the decision nlaking process (Lichtenstein and S\oYic, 2006) . The construction of preferences is heavily influenced by the nature and the context of decision. For exan1ple, the classical viev.' of decision n1ak.ing docs not antici pate that decisional conflict v.1ill influence the mak ing of decisions. Each option, according to the clas sical viev.', is assigned a subjective value, or "utility,"
and the person then proceeds to choose the option assigned the highest utility. A direct consequence of this account is that offering more alternatiYes is al\vays a good thing, since the more options there are, the more likely is the consumer to find one that proves sufficiently attractive.
BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED REGULATION • 441
In contrast to this model, behavioral research sug gests that, since pretCrences tend to be constructed in the context of decision, choices can prove difficult to make. People often search fo r a con1pclling ratio nale for choosing one option over another. Whereas sometimes a compelling reason can be articulated, at other' tin1cs no easy rationale presents itself� render ing the conflict ber.veen options hard to resolve. Such conflict can lead to the postponing of decision or to a passiYe resort to a "defau lt" option and can gener ate prefCrence patterns that are fundamentally dit1Cr ent fr on1 those predicted by accounts based on value maximization. In particular, the addition of options can excessively complicate (and, thus, ''\\•orsen ") the offered set, v.·hcreas the normative rational choice as sumption is that added options only make things bet ter (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky, 1993; Tversky and Shafir, 1992) .
In one study, for example, expert physicians had to decide about medication tOr a patient \Vith osteo arthritis. These physicians \\'ere more likely to de cline prescribing a ne\v medication when they had to choose bet\veen tv.'O nev.· medications than \Vhcn only one nev.1 medication \Vas avai lable (Rcdeln1eier and Shafir, 1995 ) . The difficulty of choosing ber.veen the t\VO medications presumably led son1c physicians to recon1n1end not starting either. A sin1ilar pattern was documented \vi th shoppers in an upscale grocery store, where tasting booths of1Cred the opportunity to taste 6 different jan1s in one condition, or any of24 ja1ns in the second condition. ()f those \vho stopped to taste, 30% proceeded to purchase a jam in the 6-jams condition, \Vhereas nlore stopped but only 3% purchased a jam in the 24-jam condition (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000 ) . Of even greater relevance to the topic at hand, Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman (2004) shov.,cd that en1ployees' participation in 40l(k) plans drops as the number of fund options nladc available by their employer increases. Bertrand et al. (2010) conducted a field experi ment v. 'ith a local lender in South Africa to assess the relative in1portance of various subtle psychological nlani pulations in the decision to take up a loan offer.
Clients were sent letters offering large, short-term loans at randomly assigned interest rates. In addi tion, several psychological fCatures on the oftCr letter \Vere also independently randomized, one of v.·hich \Vas the number of sample loans shcnvn: the otTer let ters displayed either one exa1nple of a loan size and term, along with respective nlonthly repayments, or it displayed tOur such examples. In contrast \Vith standard economic thinking and in line \Vith conflict bascd predictions, higher take -up \Vas observed under the one-option description than under the nlultiple options version. "fhe nlagnitudc of this effCct v.'as 442 • DECISION CONTEXTS large: relati\'e to the multiple-options version, the single-option description had the same positive etfcct on take-up as dropping the n1onthly interest on these loans by 1nore than 2 percentage points.
Mental Accounting
In their intuitive mental accounting .schemes, people compartmentalize \vealth and spending into dis tinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and entertainn1ent, and into separate mental accounts, such as current incon1e, assets, and fUtl1re inco1ne (Thaler, 1985; . c:ontrary to standard fungi bility assumptions, people exhibit diflCrent degrees of willingness to spend fro1n their diverse accounts.
(�ompartn1entalization can scr\'C useful functions in managing one's behavior, but it also can yield con sumption patterns that are overly dependent on cur rent income and sensitive to labels, \Vhich can lead to saving (at lo\V interest rates) and borro\ving (at higher rates) at the same time (Ausubel, 1991 ).
An understanding of such proclivities 1nay help fir1ns design instruments that bring about more desir able outcomes. For instance, with respect to retire n1ent saving, the tendency to spend one's savings is lo,ver \vhcn monies are not in transaction accounts.
And faulty plann ing , distraction, and procrastina tion all account fOr the persistent findings that saving works best as a default. l)articipation in 40l(k) plans is significantly higher \Vhen en1ployers otler automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001) , and because participants tend to retain the default contribution rates and have an easier time co1nmitting no\V to a costly step in the future, savings can be increased as a result of agreeing to increased deductions from future raises (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004; sec also Benartzi, Peleg, and Thaler, this volume) .
Knowledge and Attention
Standard theory assumes that consumers are atten tive and kno,vledgeable and typically able to gauge and avail the1nselves of in1portant infOrmation. In contrast, research suggests that n1any individuals lack kno\vledge of relevant options, program rules, benefits, and opportunities, and not only among the poor or the uneducated. Surveys show that less than one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds, funds, or other securities) can be considered "financially liter ate" (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro, 1998) , and sin1ilar findings describe the understanding sho\Vn by pen sion plan participants (Schultz, 1995 ) . Indeed, even olJer beneficiaries often do not knott' lvhat kind of pension they are set to receive, or tt'hat mix of stocks and bonds are held in their retirement accounts (1.usardi, Mitchell, and C:urto, 2009 ).
The amount of information people can and do at tend to is limited. Moreover, cognitive l<)ad has been shown to aff<:ct pertOrmancc in everyday tasks. To the extent that consumers find the1nselves in challenging situations that are unfamiliar, tense, or distracting, all of '"' hich consume cognitive resources, less focused attention will be available to process the inforination that is relevant to the decision at hand. This, in turn, can render decision n1aking even n1ore dependent on situational cues and peripheral considerations, all the more so fOr "lov.. r literate'' participants, \vho tend to experience even greater difficulties with eftOrt versus accuracy trade-offs, show overdependence on peri1)h eral cues, and tend toward a systcn1atic lvithdrawal from many n1arkct interactions (Adkins and Ozannc, 2005 ) . r nformation cannot be th ou ght ofas naturally yield ing knowledge, and knowledge cannot be assun1ed to generate the requisite behavior. People often do not fully process data that is i1nminently available because of Jimitations in attention, understanding, perceived relevance, misremen1bering, or misforccasting its in1-pact. This is often underappreciatcd by program de signers, tt'ho tend to believe that people will kno\V that \vhich is in1portant and kno\vable. In sumn1ary, for participants \Vith li1nited cognitive resources whose decisions are heavily dependent on insufficient kno\vledge, perceived norms, automatic defaults, and other n1inor contextual nuances-regulation merits even greater attention \\'ith regard to nuanced behav ioral factors.
The Power of Institutions
The substantial influence of context on behavior in1-plies, arnong other things, that institutions \viii come to play a central role in shaping ho\v people think and \Vhat they do. By institutions, \Ve n1can forn1al lav .. ·s and rules, firn1s and other organizations, structures and govern1nents, and \videspread market practices (see, e.g., Sherraden and Barr, 2005 ) . A1nong other things, default is just one of a number of alternatives, in re ality defaults persist. This persistence not only sten1s from confusion about available options, procrastina tion, forgetting, and other sources of inaction, but also may be fostered because the default is perceived as the most popular option (often a self-fulfilling prophecy), is in1plicitly recomn1endcd by experts, or is endorsed by the government.
2. Institutions shape behavior. Many lo\v-inco1nc families are, de facto, savers, \vhether or not they re sort to banks. But the availability of institutions to help foster savings can n1ake a big difference (Barr, 2004; Berry, 2004) . Without the help of a financial institution, people's savings are at risk (including tfon1 theft, impulse spending, and the needs of other household 1nen1bcrs ), savings grow more slo\vly, and they may not be available as an emergency cushion or to support access to reasonably priced credit in ti1nes of need. Institutions provide safety, guidance, and control. In circumstances of momentary need, ten1ptati(Jn, distraction, or limited self-control, those savers who are unbanked arc likely to find it all the n1ore difficult to succeed on the path to !ong-tcrn1 financial stability.
C:onsider, for exan1ple, two individuals vvith no access to credit cards: one has her paycheck directly deposited into a savings account, and the other does not. Whereas cash is not readily available to the first person, \Vho needs to take active steps to withdra\v it, cash is im1nediately available to the second, ¥.'ho n1ust take active n1easures to save it. The greater tendency to spend cash in the \Valier compared to funds de posited in the bank (Thaler, 1999) suggests that the first, ha11ked person \viJJ spend less on impulse and save more easily than the person \Vho is unbanked. Holding risk-and savings-related propensities con stant, the first person is likely to end up a nlore active and efficient saver than the second, due to nothing but a seen1ingly minor institutional arrangen1ent.
Direct deposit is an institution that can have a pro found effCct on saving. A recent survey conducted by the Atnerican Payroll Association (2002) suggests that American employees arc gaining confidence in direct deposit as a reliable method of pay1nent that gives the1n greater control over their finances, and that e1n ployers are recognizing direct deposit as a lo\v-cost employee benefit that can also save payroll processing time and money. 1'he en1ployers of the poor, in con trast, often do not require nor propose electronic sal ary payments. Instead, they prefCr not to offer direct deposit to hourly/nonexen1pt en1ployces, temporary or seasonal en1ployees, part-timers, union e1nployees, and en1p1oyees in remote locations, all categories that correlate \.Vith being lo\v paid. The most frequently
stated reasons for not oftCring direct deposit to these en1ployees include lack of processing time to meet standard industry (Automated Clearing House) re quirements, high turnover, and union contract re strictions. All this constitutes a n1issed opportunity to offer favorable access to direct c_leposit for needy individuals, "-'hose de facto default consists of going after hol1rs to cash their modest check fOr a hefty fCc.
3. Institutions provide implicit planning. As it turns out, a variety of institutions provide in1plicit planning, often in \Vays that address potential behav ioral weaknesses. Credit card companies send custon1-ers timely reminders of due payn1ents, and clients can elect to have their utility bills automatically charged, allov,ring them to avoid late fCes if occasionally they do not get around to paying in ti1ne. 1'he lo\\'-income buyer, on the other hand, without the credit card, the automatic billing, or the \Veb-based rcn1inders, risks missed payments, late tCes, disconnected utilities (fi)l lowed by high reconnection charges), etc. In fact, institutions can also sabotage planning, for exan1ple, by providing debt too easily. Temporal discounting in general and present bias in particular can be ex ploited to make i1nn1ediate cash 1nore attractive than any n1enacing future costs.
A behavioral analysis yields ne\v appreciation for the i1npact of institutions, \1\'hich affect people's lives by, an1ong other things, easing their planning, help ing them transform their intentions into actions, or enabling their resistance to temptation. c:onsider again the case of a lo\v-incon1e household. Having little slack, lo\v-income households c:annot readily cut back consun1ption in the flee of an unanticipated need or shock (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2009 ). When they do cut back, it is often on essentials. In n1any instances, cutting back means paying late, and paying late means incurring costly late fees, utility or phone reconnection tees (Edin and Lein, 1997) , and seri ous disruptions to work, education, and family litC. In other cases it means costly short-tern1 borro\ving to avoid those consequences. In principle, the lack of slack should provide lo\v-incon1e households a strong incentive to increase their buffCr-stock savings to cope \Vith a volatile environn1ent. Yet such households tend to have negligible liquid savings, in part because the financial systen1 makes it difficult for thcn1 to get ac cess to affordable savings vehicles (Barr, 2004) . financial services may provide an i1nportant path '\Vay Ollt of poverty. Such services facilitate savings to mitigate shocks and promote asset development, and they facilitate borro\ving to purchase higher-cost du rables or to help weather tough times. In short, finan cial services allovv individuals to sm(JOth consumption and invest. ln1provement of financial services, then, Behavior, Markets, and Policy:
A Conceptual Framework
A behavioral perspective pro\'ides a better account of ho\\' individuals niake decisions and is thus a useful correcti\'e to the rational agent n1odel. Yet a niodel focused on individuals is, on its O\\'n, inco1nplete as a basis for policy. "fhe perspective outlined above needs to be e1nbedded in the logic of niarkets. A frame\vork is required that takes into account fi rms' incenti\'es \Vith respect to indi\'idual behavior as \vell as to regu lation. This perspective produces t\VO din1ensions to consider: firms' interactions \Vith consumers, and fir1ns' interactions \Vith regulators.
As tOr the first, the psychological biases of indi viduals can either be aligned \Vith, or in opposition to, the interest of firn1s that 1narket products or services. In other instances, \vhere firms' incentives misalign \Vith regulatory intent, changing the rules alone n1ay not \Vork since those fi rms have strong incentives to \\'Ork creatively around those changes. Interestingly, such circumstances may lead to regulations, such as '"changing the scoring" with liability, which, although deeply motivated by behavioral considerations, are not themselves particularly psychological in nature. That is, given market responses, rules based on subtle attempts to influence individual psychology, for ex ample through defaults or framing, may be too v.,r eak, and changes in liability rules or other measures may prove necessary.
The distinction in market responses to individual psychology is central to our framework and is illus trated in table 26.1. In some cases, the market is ei ther neutral or v.,rants to overcome consumer fallibility. In other cases, the market would like to exploit or exaggerate consumer fallibility. When consumers mis understand compounding of interest in the context of saving, banks have incentives to reduce this misunder standing so as to increase deposits. When consumers misunderstand compounding in the context of bor rowing, lenders may lack the incentive to correct this misunderstanding because they can induce consumers to overborrow in \vays that maintain or enhance prof itability, at least over market-relevant time horizons.4 When consun1ers procrastinate in signing up for the Earned Income Tax Credit (and hence in fi ling for taxes), private tax preparation firms have incentives to help remove this procrastination so as to increase their customer base. When consu1ners procrastinate in re turning rebates (but make retail purchases intending to get a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the parallelism in these exan1ples: firms' incentives to alleviate or ex ploit a bias are not an intrinsic feature of the bias itself Instead, they are a function of how the bias plays itself out in the particular market structure.
In the consumer credit market, one \.vorrics that many interactions between individuals and fi rms are of the kind where fir1ns seek to exploit, rather than al leviate, bias. If true, this raises the concern of overex trapolating from the 40l(k) defaults example to credit products. To the extent that 40l(k) defaults work because the optimal behavior is largely aligned v.:ith market incentives, other areas, such as credit markets, might be more difficult to regulate \Vith n1erc de faults. Furthermore, if the credit nlarket is dominated by "lov.. '-road" fir1ns offering opaque products that "prey" on human v.. reakness, it is more likely that regu lators of such a market will be captured because "high road" interests with small market share will tend to be too weak politically to push back against the bigger low-road players. Market forces will then defeat weak positive interventions, such as the setting of defaults, and low-road players will continue to don1inate. Many observers, for example, believe that credit card mar kets were, at least prior to passage of the c:ARD Act in 2009, dominated by such lo\v-road practices (see, e.g., Bar-Gill, 2004; Mann, 2007) . If government policy makers want to attempt to use defaults in such contexts, they might need to deploy "stickier" defaults (namely, ones that might prove costly to abandon) or other more aggressive policy options.
In our conceptual approach to the issue of regu latory choice (table 26. 2 ), the regulator can either change the rules of the game or change the scoring of the game. Setting a default is an example of chang ing the rules of the gan1e, as is disclosure regulation. The rules of the gan1e are changed \vhen there is an attempt to change the nature of the interactions benveen individuals and firms, as when the regula tion attempts to affect \vhat can be said, offered, or done Changing the scoring of the game, by contrast, changes the payoffs a firm will receive for particular outcomes. This may be done \Vithout a particular rule , by contrast, 1narket incentives are largely nlisaligned '\Vi th the public interest in overcoming consumer falli bility. In that context, rule changes will typically need to be more substantial to be effective and may need to be combined with changing the scoring.
The discussion that fOllows illustrates the chal lenge to policies in the top right-hand corner of ta ble 26.3. Changing the rules of the game alone v,.ril\ often be insufficient when firn1s are highly motivated to fi nd \vork-arounds. As such, merely setting a de fault�in contrast to defaults deployed in markets on the left side of the table-will likely not \Vork. "fhus, when '\Ve suggest opt-out policies in mortgages belo\v, the challenge will be to find ways to 1nake these start ing positions "sticky" so that firms do not easily undo their defJ.ult nature. In such cases, achieving an ef fective default may require separating low-road tfo1n
high-road firms and making it profitable fOr high road firn1s to offer the default product (for a related concept, sec Kennedy, 2005) . For that to \\'ork, the default must be sufficiently attractive to consun1ers, sufficiently profitable tOr high-road firms to succeed in oftCring it, and the penalties associated \Vith devia tions ti-om the default must be sufficiently costly so as to make the detault stick even in the tace of nlarket pressures from low-road firn1s. In so1ne credit mar kets, lo\v-road firn1s may becon1e so do1ninant that sticky detaults \Viii be ineffectual. Moreover, achieving such a detault is likely to be costlier than making de faults V.'ork v.'hen market incentives align, not least be cause the costs associated \Vith the stickiness of the de tault involve greater dead-1,veight losses due to higher costs to opt out tOr those fOr \vhom deviating fron1 the default is opti1nal. Such losses v.'ould need to be \Veighed against the losses fron1 the current system, as well as against losses from alternative approaches, such as disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless, given the considerations above, it see1ns V . 'Orth ex ploring \vhether sticky detJ.ults can help to transform consumer financial nlarkets in certain contexts.
Sticky defaults are one of a set of examples we dis cuss as potential regulatory interventions based on our proposed conceptual tfa1nework. needed does not n1can that it "-"ill work.
A beha\'ioral perspective should focus in part on improving the disclosures themselves. The goal of dis closure should be to improve the quality of infOrma tion about contract terms in meaningful \vays. Simply adding information, fbr example, is unlikely to \Vork.
Disclosure policies are effective to the extent that they present a fra1ne-a \vay of parsing the disclosure that is both \veil understood and conveys salient in formation that helps the decision maker act optimally.
It is possible, for example, that infonnation about the failure frequency of particular products ( "2 out of 10 borro\vers who take this kind of loan default") rnight help, but proper framing can be difficult to achieve and to maintain consistently, given that it may vary across situations. Moreover, the attempt to in1prove decision quality through better consumer under standing, which is prcsu1ncd to change consumers'
intentions, and consequently their actions, is fraught \Vith difficulty. There is often a \vide divide between understanding, intention, and action. \villingness to develop ne\\-' n1ortgage products de signed to reach lo\ver-incon1e or n1inority borrO\\'ers \Vho might not be served by the firms' "plain vanilla"
products.7 The lack of clear rules 1night also increase consumer confusion regarding ho\v to co1npare inno vative mortgage products to each other, even \\'hile it increases consumer understanding of the products being offered. Ultimately, if consumer confusion re sults mostly from fi rm obfuscation, then our proposal \Vill likely help a good deal. By contrast, if consumer confusion in this context results n1ostly tl-om market con1plexity in product innovation, then the proposal is unlikely to make a major difference and other ap proaches focused on loan comparisons might be \Var ranted (see, e.g., Thaler and Sunstcin, 2008, this volume) . Despite the shortco1nings of an ex post standard for truth in lending, \Ve believe that such an approach is \.VOrth pursuing. To limit the costs associated \Vith our approach, the ex post detern1ination of reason ableness could be signifi cantly confined. For exa1nple, if courts are to be involved in enforcement, the ex post standard tOr reasonableness of disclosure 1night be limited to providing a (partial) defense to full pay1nent in foreclosure or bankruptcy, rather than being open to broader enforcen1ent through affirmative suits tOr damages. Alternatively, rather than court enforce ment, the ex post standard might be applied solely by the C:FPB through supervision. Furthermore, the ex post exposure 1night be significantly reduced through ex ante steps. For exan1ple, the CFPB might develop safe harbors for reasonable disclosures, issue n1odcl disclosures, or use no-action letters to provide certainty to lenders. Moreover, fi rms might be tasked with conducting regular surveys of borrowers or con ducting experimental design research to validate their disclosures; results from the research demonstrat ing a certain level of consun1er understanding might provide a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness or even a safe harbor ffom challenge:s �fhe key is to give the standard sufficient teeth without deterring innovation. The precise contours of enforce1nent and liability arc not essential to the concept, and \veigh ing the costs and benefits of such penalties, as \Veil as detailed implementation design, are beyond the scope of introdL1cing the idea here.
STICKY OPT-OUT MORTGAGE REGULATION
While the causes of the n1ortgage crisis are myriad� a central problen1 \Vas that many borro\vers took out loans that they did not understand and could not af· tOrd. Brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive than they really \Vere, because of lo\.v initial monthly payments and hidden, costly features. Families comn1only make n1istakes in tak ing out hon1e mortgages because they are misled by broker sa1es tactics, n1isunderstand the complicated tern1s and financial tradcoffs in mortgages, \vrongly
tOrecast their O\Vn behavior, and 1nisperceive their risk of borro\ving. Ho\\' many hon1eo\vners really under stand ho\v the teaser rate, introductory rate, and reset rate relate to the London Interbank Offered Rate plus son1e specified margin, or ho\v many can judge \vhether the prepayment penalty \vill offSet the gains fron1 a teaser rate?
Altering the rules of the game of disclosure, and altering the "scoring" fr>r seeking to evade proper disclosure, n1ay be sufficient to reduce the \vorst out comes. However, if market pressures and consun1er confusion arc sufficiently strong, such disclosure n1ay not be enough. If market complexity is sufficiently disruptive to consu1ner choice, product regulation 1night prove most appropriate. for example, by bar ring prepayn1ent penalties, one couki reduce lock-ins to bad 1nortgages; by barring short-tern1 ARMs and balloon payments, one could reduce the pressure to refinance; in both cases, more of the cost of the loan \vould be pushed into interest rates, and competition could focus on an explicitly stated price in the form of the APR. Such price competition \Vould benefit consumers, \vho \vould be nlore likely to understand the tcrn1s on \vhich lenders \Vere competing. Product regulation \.vould also reduce cognitive and emotional pressures related to potentially bad decision 1naking by reducing the nun1ber of choices and eliminating loan teatures that put pressure on borro\vers to re finance on bad terms. Ho\.vever, product regulation may stifle beneficial innovation, and there is ahvays the possibility that the government may simply get it \vrong, prohibiting good products and permitting bad ones.
For that reason, \Ve proposed a nc\.v form of rcg ulation.9 We proposed that a default be established \Vith increased liability exposure tOr deviations that harm consumers. For lack of a better term, \Ve called this a sticky opt-out mortgage systcn1. A sticky opt out systcn1 \vould fall, in ter1ns of stri11gency, bet\.Vecn product regulation and disclosure. For reasons \.\'e \.vill explain belo\\·, n1arket tOrces \vould likely s\. va1np a pure opt-out regime-that is \vhcrc the need tOr stickiness came in. "fhis approach corresponds to a combination of changing the rules of the gan1e (top right of table 26.3), .1nd changing liability standards (botton1 right of that table).
'fhe proposal is grounded in our equilibriun1 nlodel of incentives frlr firms and of indiYidual psy chology. Many borro\vers may be unable to co1nparc complex loan products and act optimally for then1-selves based on such an understanding (see, e.g., Ausubel, 1991) . We thus deploy an opt-out stratet,' Y to make it easier tOr borrowers to choose a standard product and harder tOr then1 to choose a product they are less likely to understand. At the same tin1c, lenders 1nay seek to extract surplus fr om borro\vers because of asymn1ctric intOrmation about future in co1nc or dctiult probabilities (Musto, 2007) , and, in the short tenn, lenders and brokers may benefit tfom selling bornnvcrs loans they cannot afford. Thus, a pure dctJ.ult v-.r ould be undennincd by the firms, and regulation needs to take account of this market pres sure by pushing back.
Tn our 1nodel, lenders \vould be required to offer eligible borro,vcrs a standard mortgage (or set of 1nortgages), such as a fixed-rate, sclf-an1or tizing thirty-year n1ortgage loan or a standard ARM: prod Lh.-t according to reasonable undcr\vriting standards.
The pn.:cisc contours of the standard set of mortgages \vould be set by regulation. Lenders \vould be fr ee to charge \vhatevcr interest rate they \vanted on the loan and, subject to the constraints outlined belo\v, could ofter \vhatever other loan products they \\'anted outside of the standard package. Borrowers, however, \vould get the standard mortgage otlCred, unless they chose to opt out in tJ.vor of a nonstandard option ot: fe red by the lender, after honest and con1prchensibk: disclosures fr on1 brokers or lenders about the tern1s and risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out tnortgage syste111 \vould n1ean borrowers \vould be tnore likely to get straightfor\\'ard loans they could understand.
Rut a plain-vanilla opt-out policy is likely to be in adequate. Unlike the savings context, \vherc market incentives align \Veil \Vith policies to overcon1e be havioral biases, in the context of credit 111arkets, firms ofren have an incentive to hide the true costs of bor ro\ving. Given the strong market pressures to devi ate tfon1 the detJ.ult oftCr, \\'e \Vould need to require 111ore than a si111ple opt-out to 111ake the defJ.ult stick.
Deviation fron1 the offer \vould require heightened disclosures and additional legal exposure for lenders in order to make the detJult sticky. Under our plan, lenders \vould have stronger incentives to provide n1eaningful disclosures to those \vhon1 they convince to opt out, because they \\'ould fa ce increased regula tory scrutiny or increased costs if the loans did not \Vork out. future \vork v.·ill need to explore in greater de tail the entOrce1nent mechanism. for exan1ple, under one potential approach to 1naking the opt-out sticky, if detJ.ult occurs after a bornl\ver has opted out, the borro\ver could raise the lack of reasonable disclosure as a defense to bankruptcy or fOre closure. Using an objective reasonableness standard akin to that used tOr \\'arranty analysis under the UnitOrn1 Commercial c:ode,111 if the court detern1ined that the disclosure \vould not effectively con1n1unicate the key tenns and risks of the mortgage to the typical borro\ver, the court could modit)r the loan contract. Although Congress rejected this proposal in the Dodd-Frank Act, if Congress \Vere to revisit the issue, it could au thorize the CFPB to entOrce the require1nent on a supervisory basis rather than relying on the courts.
The agency would be responsible for supervising the disclosures according to a reasonableness standard and would impose a fine on the lender and order corrective actions if the disclosures were tOund to be unreasonable. "fhe precise nature of the stickiness re quired and the trade-oftS involved in imposing these costs on lenders would need to be explored in greater detail, but in principle, a sticky opt-out policy could eftCctively leverage the behavioral insight that detJ.ults matter with the industrial organizational insight that market incentives V.'ork against the advantages of a pure opt-out policy in n1any credit markets.
An opt-out mortgage system \vith stickiness might provide several benefits over current market outcon1es.
For one, a "plain vanilla" set \Vould be easier to com pare across mortgage offers. IntOrmation \vould be more efficiently transmitted across the market. Con sumers would be likely to understand the key terms and features of such standardized products better than they \vould alternative n1ortgage products. Price con1petition \Vott!d be more salient once the fe atures \Vere standardized. Behaviorally, when alternative, "non-vanilla" products are introduced, the consumer \vould be made <.n.vare that these represent deviations fr om the dctJ.ult, anchoring consumers on the de tJ. ult product and providing some basic expectations tOr \vhat ought to enter into the choice. Fran1ing the mortgage choice as one bet\veen accepting standard n1or tgage otfers and needing affirn1atively to choose a nonstandard product should improve consumer decision making. Creditors \vill be required to make heightened disclosures about the risks of alternative loan products, subject to legal sanction in the event of failure to reasonably disclose such risks; the legal sanctions should deter creditors tfom making highly unreasonable alternative offers \Vi th hidden and con1-plicatcd tenns. c:onsumcrs may be less likely to make significant n1istakes. In contrast to a pure product reg ulation approach, the sticky default approach alknvs lenders to continue to develop ne\v kinds of mort gages, but only v.:hen they can adequately explain key terms and risks to borro\vers.
Moreover, requiring a default acco1npanied by heightened disclosures and increased legal exposure tOr deviations 1nay help boost high-road lending rela tive to lo\v-road lending-at least if deviations result ing in harm are appropriately penalized. If offering an opt-out mortgage product helps to split the n1arket bet\veen high-and lov,.r-road firms and re\vards the fo nner, the 1narket 1nay shift (back) to\vard finns that ofter home mortgage products that better serve bor ro\vers. For this to \York effectively, the default-and etlorts to make it sticky-should enable the consumer easily to distinguish the typical "good'� loan, benefit ing both lender and borrov.'er, from a \vide range of "'bad" loans that benefit the lender \V ith higher rates and fe es but harm the borrov,rer; that benefit the bor rower but harm the lender; or that harn1 borrower and lender but benefit third parties, such as brokers.
There will be costs associated with requiring an opt-<)Ut hon1e n1ortgage . For example, sticky defaults n1ay not be sticky enough to alter outcon1es, given market pressures. The default could be undermined through the firm's incentive structures fo r loan offi cers and brokers, which could provide greater rewards fi:)r nonstandard loans. Implementation of the measure may be costly, and the disclosure requirement and un certainty regarding enforcement of the standard might reduce overall access to home mortgage lending. There n1ay be too many cases in which alternative products are optin1al, so that the defau lt product is in essence 
PROGRESS UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT
The Dodd-frank Act fundan1entally reforms con sumer financial protection policy in the United States.
In the mortgage market, the Dodd-Frank Act un dertakes a number of steps to regulate the relation ship ben.veen borrowers and 1nortgage brokers. For exa1nple, the act requires registration and i1nposes a duty of care on mortgage brokers; bans steering to higher-cost products; and bans YSPs. The act requires that mortgage brokers and lenders assess a borro\ver's ability to repay based on docun1cntcd inco1nc, taking into account the fully indexed, fully amortizing rate on a mortgage. The act prohibits 1nandatory predispute arbitration clauses (\vhich lin1it one's right to access the courts), and it enhances disclosure requirements.
It requires the use of escrow of taxes and insurance for higher-cost loans and i1nprovcs escrow disclosure fo r all loans. It makes a number of changes to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (H()EPA) to make it more effective and provide greater consumer protection.
The Dodd-Frank Act also puts in place t\vo provi sions that tO ster standardization in the products of fered to consumers. The act requires risk retention tOr securitization of mortgage loans but exempts Qualified Residential Mortgages, which are designed to be standard, high-quality mortgage products \\'ith straightfor\vard tenns and solid under\\rriting. for loans falling outside this category that are securi tized, the securitizer (or the originator) would need to retain capital to back a portion of the securitiza tion risk. There \vould thus be a strong incentive to make Qualified Residential Mortgages. The Dodd frank Act also sets out provisions for qualified 1nort gages, ones tOr \\'hich the ability-to-pay requirc1nent is dee1ned to be 1net. In sum, the act defines an ap proach to the standardization of the tern1s and under writing of such mortgages. Lenders making nonquali fied n1ortgages face a larger potential risk of liability in the event that such loans fail.
More fundamentally, the act put in place the new CFPB to supervise major financial institutions and to set rules and enfi)rce consun1cr protections across the market. In addition to its authorities to set rules tOr and enforce existing consun1er financial protection la\vs, the CFPB has the authority to ban unfair, de ceptive, or abusive acts or practices. The bureau can also prescribe rules tOr disclosures of any consu1ner fi nancial product. In doing so, it v.rill rely on consun1er testing, can issue model disclosures that provide a safe harbor tOr compliance, and n1ay pern1it financial in stitutions to use trial disclosure programs to test out the eftCctiveness of alternative disclosures to those pro\'ided tOr in the CFPB 1nodel tO rm. The Bureau is 1nandated to merge conflicting n1ortgage disclo sures fron1 the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and TILA into a simple tO rm. (�onsumers are provided \Vith rights to access infr>nnation about their O\vn product usage in standard, machine readable tOrmats. Over time, the CFPB 1nay generate research and cxperin1cntation that \\'ill i1nprove our understanding of consun1er financial decision mak ing, and in turn v.'ill support the bureau's supervision, rule-\\Titing, and cnforcc1ncnt.
In addition to these changes to consumer finan cial protection, the act makes a nu1nber of changes to in\'estor protection. For exan1ple, it provides the Securities and Exchange Con1n1ission (SEC) \Ni th authority to engage in investor testing to i1nprove disclosures or other rules. The SEC is authorized to clarify the duties of invest1ncnt advisors and broker dealers so that they have the same high standard of care-a fiduciary duty (\vhich, until no\v, investrncnt advisors had but broker-dealers providing individual ized investment advice did not). 'fhe con1mission is also authorized to require better disclosures of bro ker duties and conflicts of interest and to n1andate prcsalc disclosures for investn1ent products. Like the CFPB, the SEC: is authorized to restrict 111andatory predispute arbitration. These changes should niateri ally advance investor protections consistent \Vith the frame\vork we have laid out.
Behaviorally Informed Credit Card Regulation USING FRAMING AND SALIENCE IN DISCLOSURES TO ENCOURAGE GOOD CREDIT CARD BEHAVIOR
Credit card companies have fine-tuned product offer ings and disclosures in a 1nanner that appears to be systen1atically designed to prey on common psycho logical biases-biases that lin1it consu1ner ability to n1ake opti1nal choices regarding credit card borro\ving (Bar-(; ill, 2004) . Behavioral econon1ics suggests that consumers underestimate ho\v much they \vill borro\v and o\'eresti1nate their ability to pay their bills in a timely manner, and credit card companies then price their credit cards and compete on the basis of these fundan1ental hurnan fa iling�. Nearly 60% of credit card holders do not pay their bills in full e\'ery month (Bucks et al., 2006) . Moreover, excessive credit card debt can lead to bankruptcy (Mann, 2006) . Mann ( 2007) has argued that credit card companies seek to keep consumers in a "s\N·eat box" of distressed credit card debt, paying high fees fOr as long as possible be fore finally succun1bing to bankruptcy.
The 2005 bankruptcy legislation focused on the need tOr in1proved borro\ver responsibility but paid insufficient attention to creditor responsibility frlr bornJv.. 'ing patterns. 
AN OPT-OUT PAYMENT PLAN FOR CREDIT CARDS
A related approach, intended to fJ. c ilitate behavior through intention, \V ould be to develop an opt-out payment plan for credit cards under which consumers would need to elect a default payment level meant to pay off their existing balance over a chosen pe riod of tin1e unless the custon1er affirmatively opted out and chose an alternative payn1ent at any point. 
REGULATE LATE FEES
One problen1 with the pricing of credit cards is that credit card firms can charge late and over-limit fe es with relative impunity because consumers typically do not believe ex ante that they \v ill pay such fe es.
Instead, consumers shop based on other f3.ctors, such as annual fe es, interest rates, or various rev.'ard pro grams. In principle, fir1ns need to charge late and over-limit fe es in order to incentivize customers to avoid late fe es and going over their credit limits. Jn practice, given the high fe es they charge, credit card firms are perfectly content to let consumers pay late and exceed their limits.
In earlier \Vork, \Ve proposed changing the scor ing of the game (corresponding to a regulatory choice in the bottom right of table 26.3). Under our pro posal, firn1s could deter consumers fr om paying late or going over their credit card limits \Vith whatever fe es they deemed appropriate, but the bulk of such tees would be placed in a public trust to be used tOr financial education and assistance to troubled bor ro\vers. Firn1s \V ould retain a fixed percentage of the tees to pay for their actual costs incurred fr om late pay1nents or over-lin1it charges, and tOr any increased risks of default that such behavior presages. The ben efit of such an approach is that it per1nits fir1ns to deter "bad conduct" by consumers who pay late or go over credit liinits but prevents fir1ns fro1n profiting fr o1n consun1ers' predictable n1isforecasts regarding their own late payment and over-the-limit behaviors.
Firms' incentives to encourage or overcharge tOr such behaviors \v ould be ren1ovcd, \.vhile their incentives to deter consumer f3.ilures appropriately and cover a firm's costs v.·hen they occur \v ould be maintained.
ADVANCES IN THE CARD ACT OF 2009
The Federal Reserve 2007a ,b, 2008 , the act requires a consun1er's payments above the minimum required to be applied first toward higher-cost balances. In addition, the act takes up the concern \Vith late tCes but goes beyond our proposals. Instead, recognizing that consumers do not shop for penalty fe es and that they often mis fo recast their O\Vn behavior, it requires that late tCcs and other penalty fe es be ''reasonable and propor tionate," as detern1ined by implementing rules; that in any event the fe es not be larger than the amount charged that is over the limit or late; and that a late fee or other penalty tee cannot be assessed more than once frlr the san1e transaction or event. Furthermore, the act takes steps to make it easier fOr the market to Direct-deposit tax refund accounts could be used to encourage saYings and expanded access to bank ing services, \vhile reducing reliance on costly refund anticipation loans and check-cashing services (Barr 2004 (Barr , 2007 . Under the plan, unbanked lo\\'-inco111e households \Vho file their tax returns \Vould haYc their tax refunds directly deposited into a ne\v account.
l)ircct deposit is significantly cheaper and taster than paper checks, both fi>r the government and for taxpay er.�. Ta xpayers could choose to opt out of the systein if they did not \Vant to directly deposit their refund, but the expectation is that the accounts \Votild be \vidcly accepted since they \Vould significantly reduce the costs and expedite the tin1ing of receiving one's tax refund. By using an opt-out strategy and reach ing households at tax tin1e, this approach couJd help to 0Yercon1c the tendency to procrastinate in setting up accounts. By reducing the tin1e it takes to receive a refund and pern1itting a portion of the funds to be used to pay for tax preparation, setting up such ac counts could help to reduce the incentives to take out costly refund loans, incentives that are magnified by ten1poral 1nyopia and misunderstanding regarding the costs of credit. Such accounts would also eliminate the need to use costly check-cashing services fr>r one's tax refund check. Moreover, the account could con tinue to be used past tax tin1e. Households could use the account like any other bank account-to receive their income, save, pay bills, and, of course, to receive their refund in follc)\ving years. There are a variety of \\'ays to structure these accounts, all of \Vhich \Vould deploy opt-out strategies and government bundling to reach scale and better align the costs of overcom ing consun1er bias \Vith the shared benefit of 111ov ing households into the banking system. Such an ap proach could efficiently bring n1illions of households into the banking systen1.
The po\ver of these initiatives could be significantly increased if it \Vere coupled \Vith a series of behavior ally infOrn1cd efforts to i111prove th e take-up of the accounts and the savings outcon1es fo r account hold ers. For exa1nple, banks could encourage en1ployers
to endorse direct deposit and auton1atic sayings plans to set up default rules that \Vould increase savings outcon1es. With an auto1natic savings plan, accounts could be structured so that holders could designate a portion of their paycheck to be deposited into a sav ings «pocket"; the savings fe ature \\'Ould rely on the prccon11nitn1ent device of auton1atic savings, and the funds \vould be some\vhat 1nore difficult to access than those in the regular bank account to make the com1nitment n1ore likely to stick. To provide the necessary access to e1nergency funds in a more cost-effective manner than is usually available to LMI households, the bank account could also include a six-1nonth con su1ner loan \Vith direct deposit and direct debit, using relationship banking and auton1ated pay111ent systems to provide an alternative to costly payday loans. With direct deposit of income and direct debit of interest and principal due, the loan should be relatiYely lo\v risk and costless fOr the bank to service. With a lon ger pay1nent period than in typical payday lending, the loan should be 1nore manageable fOr consumers living paycheck to paycheck and \vould likely lead to less repeated borro\ving undertaken to stay current on past loans. Moreover, the loan repayn1ent features could also include a provision that consumers "pay 
Conclusion
We have proposed a conceptual fr amework for behav iorally infor1ned regulation. The frame\\'ork relies on a retains the classical perspective of consumers interact ing \\'i th firms in competiti\'e nlarkets. The difference is that consumers are no\v understood to be fa llible in systematic and important \vays, and firms are seen to have incentives to overcome or to exploit these shortcomings.
More generally, fir1ns not only \\'ill operate on the contour defined by human psychology but also \viii respond strategically to regulations. And finns get to act last. Because the firm has a great deal of latitude in issue fiaming, product design, and so on, they have the capacity to affect consumer behavior and in so doing to circumvent or pervert regulatory constraints.
Ironically, firms' capacity to do so is enhanced by their interaction ivith "behavioral" consumers (as opposed to the hypothetically rational consumers of neoclassi cal cconon1ic theory), since so many of the things a regulator would find hard or undesirable to control (e.g. ti ames, design nuance, complexity) can be used to influence consumers' behavior greatly. The chal lenge of behaviorally intOrmed regulation, therefore, is to envision not only the role of human behavior, but also the \\'ays in \vhich firn1s are likely to respond to consumer behavior and to the structure of regulation.
We have developed a model in which outcon1es are an equilibrium interaction between individuals \Vith specific psychologies and firms that respond to those psychologies within specific markets. l"hese outcomes may not be socially optimal. To the extent that the interaction produces real harm, regulation could ad dress the potential social \Velfare implications of this equilibriun1. Taking both individual psychology and industrial organization seriously suggests the need tOr policy makers to consider a range of market-context specific policy options, including both changing the "rules" of the game, as well as changing its "scoring."
We have explored some specific applications of this conceptual fr ame\vork for financial services.
Notes
1. In addition to incentives to increase savings, employers also seek to boost en1ployee retention, and they must com ply \Vith fe deral pension rules designed to ensure that the plan5 an: not "top heavy. " Moreover, there are significant con1pliance issues regarding pensions and retiren1ent plans, disclosure fa ilures, fe e churning and complicated and costly fee structures, and conflicts of interest in plan managen1ent,
as \veil as problems with encouraging employers to sign up luv ... ·"'':age workers fO r retirement plans. Yet, as a comparative matter, 1 narket incentiYes to overco 1 ne psychological biases in order to encourage saving arc more aligned with optimal social policy than arc nlarket incentives to exacerbate psy chological biases to encourage borro\ving.
2. \Ve use this bin1odal franlC\vork of regulatory choice to sin1p!ify the exploration of ho\\' our n1odel of individual psychology and firm incentives affects regulation. We ac kno\vkdgc that the regulatory choice matrix is n1ore com plex (see Barr, 2005) .
3. This is largely because of the existing regulatory fran1e\vo rk: pension regulation gives en1ploycrs incentives to enroll lowcr-incon1c individnals in 40l(k) progran1s. Absent these, it is likely that firn1s \v ould he happy to discourage enrollment since they often n1ust pay the n1atch fi)r these individuals. This point is interesting because it suggests that even defaults in savings only \Vork because some other regu lation "changed the scoring" of the gan1e.
4. This example abstracts fron1 collection coses (\�:hich \vould reduce finns' incentives to hide borro\ving costs) and instead frKuses on the short-term behavior generally exhib ited by firms, as in the recent home 1nortgage crisis.
5. In the interests of fi.ill disclosure, one of us (Barr) 7. Although the financial industry often calls tor "prin ciples based" approaches to regulation, in the course of the })odd-Frank Act legislative debate, the industry strongly re sisted this approach, perhaps for these reasons.
8. Ian Ayres recently suggested to us that the burden might be placed on the plaintitTto use consumer survey data to sho\\-' thac the disclosure was unreasonable, si1nilar to the process used under the Lanhan1 Act fo r fa lse advertising claims. In individual cases, this might be infeasible, but such an approach might work either for class actions or fo r clain1s brought by the Cf PB.
9. Again, in the interest of full disclosure, this proposal was included in the Treasury Department's legislation tor the new <:FPB but \Vas not included in the final legislation as enacted.
10. See the discussion above relating to the reasonable ness standard for disclosure. As noted above, consumer survey evidence could be introduced, either by the <:FPB, plaintiftS, or defendants, as to the reasonableness standard.
11. Sec Jackson and Burlingame (2007) . While in prin ciple YSPs could permit lenders lcgiti1natcly to pass on the cost of a mortgage broker tee to a cash-strapped borrower in the fOrm of a higher interest rate rather than in the fOnn of a cash payment, the evidence suggests that YSPs are in fact used to compensate brokers for getting bornnvcrs to accept higher interest rates, prepayment penalties, and other loan tcrn1s.
